A number you already hold
Send the one-time SMS code only to a number independently established under the firm's procedure. A successful result does not establish identity or transaction authority.
Scam complaints turn a fast instruction into a slow reconstruction: what did the firm check, what did it record, and what else does the evidence show?
A firm may receive an instruction through the client's genuine mailbox, on a familiar thread and with a signed form. A genuine email account, familiar thread or signed form may be relevant evidence, but may not resolve whether the client authorised the particular instruction.
AFCA decides what is fair in all the circumstances. It considers the applicable legal principles, codes or guidance, good industry practice and relevant determinations, together with the facts and evidence of each complaint. From 12 March 2026, AFCA expanded its jurisdiction over eligible scam complaints involving receiving banks and accounts or credit facilities opened in the complainant's name without consent or authority, including complaints by non-customers. The change expands access to AFCA for these complaints; liability still depends on the applicable obligations and circumstances, and it does not determine or discharge an advice firm's separate obligations.
Bank scam determinations illustrate the importance of context and evidence. They do not establish that a particular adviser workflow or SMS check satisfies a legal duty.
What to keep
Record the instruction, the checks performed, their results, approvals and exceptions, so the firm can explain its actions if a dispute arises.
An illustrative scenario, not a summary of a particular AFCA determination.
A withdrawal, rollover or changed-account request arrives from the client's real email address or is supported by a caller who knows the portfolio and recent conversations.
Staff test the document, signature or email for surface consistency, but do not check the instruction through a contact route established independently of it.
The destination belongs to the scam. The genuine client later disputes authority, and the firm's procedure, warnings, records and response become part of the evidence.
Contemporaneous records help reconstruct what happened, alongside the parties' recollections and other relevant circumstances.
An AFS licensee can assess these suggested controls against its services, risks, legal obligations and approved procedures. No cited AFCA determination or ASIC guidance prescribes this workflow or treats an SMS check as sufficient.
Define when your approved procedure requires additional checks, including for withdrawals, rollovers, changed payment details, unusual disclosure requests and other identified risks.
Use independently established contact details from a trusted record, and investigate recent or suspicious changes before relying on them. Never use contact details supplied in the message being checked.
Treat the contact-check result separately from any required identity, authority, account-ownership, document and approval checks.
If a check fails, pause the instruction, preserve relevant records and follow the approved investigation and escalation process, using independently established contact details. A failure can have an innocent explanation.
Retain relevant records under the firm's record-keeping and privacy requirements, including the instruction, checks, approvals and exceptions.
Review exceptions and bypasses, and require documented reasons, appropriate approval and any additional controls.
Send the one-time SMS code only to a number independently established under the firm's procedure. A successful result does not establish identity or transaction authority.
The check is logged with its time, method and outcome. Review the available record and export fields before building them into your procedure.
Users with the required permissions can export available audit records as PDF or CSV for retention alongside the firm's other records. The result is one part of the evidence of the firm's process; its significance depends on the circumstances and other evidence.
Vericode records a contact-check result. It does not verify identity or transaction authority, shift liability, determine compliance, or satisfy AFSL, AFCA, SPF, AML/CTF or other regulatory obligations. It does not guarantee any fraud, insurance or dispute outcome.
As at 27 October 2026, the SPF has a staged implementation. Covered banks, telcos and digital platforms were required to join AFCA from 1 September 2026. Most obligations apply from 31 March 2027, and AFCA's SPF complaint jurisdiction covers relevant matters occurring on or after that date. Existing AFCA financial-services jurisdiction continues separately. Holding an AFSL does not, by itself, make an advice firm subject to SPF obligations.
Scams Prevention Framework explainerAFCA reports scam-complaint trends, including 5,977 scam complaints. It does not prescribe this procedure or assess Vericode.
Read sourceAFCA's guidance on its jurisdiction over receiving banks and accounts opened without consent, effective 12 March 2026.
Read sourceThe current AFCA Rules, including Rule A.14 on how AFCA decides what is fair in all the circumstances.
Read sourceASIC's guidance that compliance measures depend on the nature, scale and complexity of the licensee's business.
Read sourceLaw-firm commentary on AFCA scam determinations, including an HSBC unauthorised-transaction determination under the ePayments Code. Commentary, not AFCA or ASIC guidance.
Read sourceLaw-firm commentary written before the SPF instruments were made, so some of its dates are out of date. Use the legislation and AFCA's publications for current dates.
Read sourceSources checked 27 October 2026. References to AFCA, ASIC and AUSTRAC explain the regulatory context. They do not indicate endorsement, approval or certification of Vericode.